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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

(June 1960 to November 1960)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
(June 1960 to November 1960)

This is a working paper. It traces the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute--on world Communist strategy, on Chinese foreign and domestic policies, on relations among the parties of the world Communist movement, and on other aspects of the Sino-Soviet relationship--from the Bucharest conference of June 1960 to the opening of the Moscow conference of the Communist parties in November 1960.

Almost half of this paper is occupied with three extraordinarily valuable documents--summaries of, and copious extracts from, the Soviet party's letter of 21 June to the Chinese party, the Chinese party's letter of 10 September in reply, and the Soviet party's letter of 5 November (to the Chinese party and other parties) in reply to the 10 September letter. These letters spectacularly confirmed the existence of Sino-Soviet disputes on a wide range of issues--some of which had been deduced with varying degrees of assurance from the Soviet and Chinese press, and some others of which had been reported [redacted] The letters added greatly to the community's knowledge of these disputes and they revealed other disputes which had not been deduced or reported.

Another paper, to follow in a month or so, will deal with the proceedings of the November conference of the 81 parties, the Moscow declaration of 6 December, and subsequent Soviet and Chinese presentations (which have differed considerably) of that declaration.

[redacted] would welcome comment on this paper, addressed in this instance to the acting coordinator of the group, at [redacted]

SUMMARY

In the winter of 1957-58, the Chinese party began to advocate a rather different bloc strategy from that pursued by the Soviet party. Whereas Khrushchev favored a low-risk strategy, making steady gains by non-military means, Mao favored a much more aggressive, high-risk strategy, looking to much more rapid gains, especially in the underdeveloped areas. By June 1960, Soviet and Chinese substantive positions, in support of these differing strategies, were virtually complete.

With respect to the basic assessment, the balance of power, Moscow conceded that the West was still strong, while Peiping disparaged the West and its weapons systems. From this fundamental divergence, other important differences derived.

Whereas Moscow spoke of the disastrous consequences of nuclear war for the world, Peiping emphasized the bloc's survival capabilities and its ability to build a new world rapidly. Whereas Moscow emphasized the decreasing possibility of general war, Peiping emphasized US preparations for war and reportedly argued privately that an eventual war was inevitable. Whereas Moscow emphasized the ability of the bloc to deter the West also from local wars, and emphasized also the danger of expansion of local wars, Peiping contended that such wars were inevitable and should sometimes be welcomed, and it minimized the dangers of expansion. Whereas Moscow promised to support "just" wars but tended to evade this subject, the Chinese jeered that Moscow was so afraid of general war that it would not adequately support these "just" wars, including "liberation" wars.

Further, whereas Moscow insisted that "peaceful coexistence" was the long-term objective of the entire bloc, defining this term as envisaging competition by all means short of war, Peiping argued that the concept misrepresented relations with the West and that even a militant interpretation of it impeded the struggle with the West. Similarly, whereas the Soviets contended that there were "realistic" leaders in the West, that negotiations were worthwhile, and that disarmament was both a useful issue and a feasible long-range goal, Peiping charged that Moscow was being gulled by the West, that the emphasis should be on struggle and not on talks, and that total disarmament was an "illusion."

Further, whereas Moscow asserted the increasing possibility and desirability of Communist parties coming to power by peaceful means, Peiping argued that violence was almost always both necessary and desirable and that Communist parties must have the courage to employ it.

Further, in policy toward underdeveloped countries, Moscow and Peiping were in important disagreement as to how fast to seek independence for the remaining colonies and semi-colonies (countries regarded as indirectly under imperialist control, like Batista's Cuba), and as to how fast to try to knock over the newly-independent governments and replace them with Communist regimes. Moscow emphasized the need for protracted cooperation with bourgeois nationalist leaders in the newly-independent countries and with bourgeois forces in the countries not yet independent, subordinating the local Communist parties to this end when necessary, while Peiping accused Moscow of exaggerating the importance of the neutrals, emphasized the unreliability of their leaders, called for an effort to bring them down more rapidly, and urged Communist movements in colonial areas to seize leadership of the revolution from the bourgeoisie in its early stages.

Futher, whereas Moscow called for a gradualist program in Western countries, emphasizing Communist cooperation for "democratic"goals, Peiping derided this program as "opportunist" and urged the "revolutionary overthrow" of Western governments.

Finally, whereas Moscow pursued a flexible policy in the world Communist fronts, aimed at enlisting maximum cooperation from non-Communists, Peiping called for the fronts to be "fighting organizations" seeking cooperation only on Communist terms.

Following their action in April 1960 in carrying the Sino-Soviet dispute into other parties and their rejection in May of another Soviet bid for bilateral talks, the Chinese angered the Soviet party by their behavior at the WFTU conference in Peiping in early June. The Chinese publicly criticized the Soviet line at the conference, and lobbied against Soviet positions in private meetings. At this point the Russians arranged for a meeting of world Communist parties in Bucharest later in the month.

As the Bucharest conference opened, the Soviet party circulated a long letter denouncing the Chinese party. After reviewing the substantive issues noted above, the Soviet letter accused the Chinese of "disloyal and uncomradely" behavior, and closed with an indirect but clear threat to reduce Soviet aid to China unless the CCP backed down. Before issuing its thin and ambiguous communiqué, the conference heard speeches from the delegates of most of the 50 parties represented; most of these supported the Soviet party, but a few were neutral, and at least one (the Albanian) supported the Chinese. During these meetings, Khrushchev reviewed Soviet charges against Chinese views on foreign policies and Chinese domestic programs; he added some charges relating to Chinese failure to cooperate in certain military projects and Chinese collusion with other parties, observed that the Chinese were too untrustworthy to be given nuclear weapons, and attacked Mao personally for being as vain and as isolated from reality as Stalin had been. The Chinese retorted in kind, including a personal attack on Khrushchev as having "betrayed" Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The conference closed with both the Soviet and Chinese angry and other parties considerably shaken. It was agreed to hold another conference in Moscow in November.

Immediately after the Bucharest meeting, Moscow began to apply pressure on Peiping. In early July, the Soviet press began a systematic refutation of Chinese positions, Soviet media stopped commenting on Chinese affairs, and Moscow informed Peiping that the CCP's Russian-language magazine circulated in the USSR must be suspended. A Soviet central committee plenum in mid-July denounced the CCP (not named) for "leftwing sectarian deviation."

The heaviest blow came on 25 July, when Moscow informed Peiping that all or virtually all Soviet technicians in China--as estimated 2,000 to 3,000--would be withdrawn in the next five weeks. This action was carried out, despite Chinese protests that the withdrawal would seriously impair the Chinese program of economic development.

The Soviet party remained on the offensive throughout August, and the Soviet press began to warn China--named for the first time--of the consequences of separation from the bloc. Moscow in August increased its effort to isolate

the Chinese party, through letters to other parties reviewing the dispute and asking for their support. The Chinese party retorted with articles implying Peiping's willingness to do without Soviet aid if necessary. In early September, Soviet and Chinese representatives quarreled publicly at the Viet Minh party congress in Hanoi.

On 10 September, the Chinese party sent a long letter to the Soviet party designed to refute the Soviet letter circulated at Bucharest. The letter reviewed the development of Sino-Soviet differences since 1956, defended Chinese behavior, cited many instances in the previous year of Khrushchev's adoption of "non-Marxist" positions, reaffirmed contrary Chinese positions, and, inter alia, strongly attacked Soviet "concession, complacency, tolerance, and compromise" in relations with the West. The concluding section of the letter asserted that Soviet party resolutions could not be binding on other Communist parties, indicated an intention to withstand the majority support for the Soviet party in the world Communist movement, observed that this majority in any case was a temporary phenomenon, asserted that the "verdict of history" would vindicate Peiping, accused Moscow (correctly) of exerting pressure on the Chinese by withdrawing the technicians, and concluded grandly that "truth cannot be bought."

In mid-September, two of Mao's top lieutenants went to Moscow for bilateral talks and for work on the preparatory committee for the Moscow conference. The Soviet and Chinese press continued through September and October the polemical exchanges on the substantive issues, on (Chinese) "adventurism" and (Soviet) "opportunism", on the relative dangers of (Chinese) "dogmatism" and (Soviet) "revisionism," and so on. Khrushchev in early October revealed that there had also been border incidents between the USSR and China; he also discussed pro-Soviet forces in the Chinese party leadership; further, he predicted that the Moscow conference would not resolve the dispute. He is also reported to have said--and in this he proved to be wrong--that the Chinese had only one supporter, the Albanian party, in the world Communist movement.

The preparatory committee for the November conference, meeting in the first three weeks of October, failed to arrive at a fully-agreed draft declaration. The Chinese presumably stood on the positions taken in their 10 September letter on both substantive issues and the discipline of the world Communist movement, in particular (this is confirmed) on their refusal to accept the principle of majority rule in the movement. The Soviet representatives presumably took the positions later stated in their 5 November letter, including their insistence on the principle of majority rule. The Chinese may have had the full support of the Albanian delegation and support on certain issues from the Australian, Cuban, Indonesian, Japanese and North Vietnamese delegations. In any case, the committee after three weeks was able to arrive at a nominal agreement on most of the formulations relating to world Communist strategy and the discipline of the movement, but could not reach agreement on some others, in particular on the principle of majority rule. The draft was left uncompleted, for referral to the November conference.

On 5 November the Soviet party replied formally to the Chinese party's letter of 10 September. The Soviet letter reviewed the record of Chinese misbehavior and Soviet rectitude, reaffirmed Soviet positions on substantive issues in strong terms, and struck especially hard at the Chinese willingness to risk general war. It stated flatly that the West "is not a paper tiger," and it described this and other Chinese attitudes as "extremely dangerous." It reiterated the demand that the Chinese party respect majority opinion. It reviewed Soviet aid to China, and asserted that Chinese goods given in exchange were really of "no use." The letter concluded that the Soviet party and its supporters were "seriously alarmed" by Chinese obstinacy, and that the world Communist movement could not wait for the "verdict of history."

As the Communist delegations arrived in Moscow, they were reportedly given this 5 November letter, plus the

uncompleted draft resolution for the conference to consider, plus a Soviet briefing in which the Soviet party asked for their support. By this time both the Soviet and Chinese parties had gone to much effort to encourage the view that neither would back down at the conference, even if this meant the separation--voluntary or involuntary--of the Chinese party from the world Communist movement. In other words, the two parties were playing "chicken"--and it was not known whether either was willing to swerve at the last moment.

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INTRODUCTION

Before attempting to reconstruct developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship in the period from the Bucharest conference of Communist parties (June 1960) up to the Moscow conference of the parties (November 1960), it might be useful to recapitulate some earlier papers in this series, sketching the background of this critical period in Sino-Soviet relations.

In early 1956 the first serious rift in the Sino-Soviet relationship came to light. Khrushchev apparently did not consult the Chinese before attacking Stalin in his secret speech of February 1956. The Chinese believed that the attack on Stalin--whom Mao much admired--was too extreme, amounting to an attack on the essentials of Communism itself. At the same time, they believed that the Soviet party had not yet corrected what the Chinese too regarded as Stalin's mistakes in Soviet relations with other parties, especially in Eastern Europe. This latter belief led Peiping to encourage Poland and Hungary in the early stages of their defiance of Moscow in autumn 1956, which much complicated Moscow's problems there.

In 1957, Mao, mistaking obedience for love, made his experiment with liberalization in China, the "hundred flowers" program. This experiment, going beyond Khrushchev's own loosening of Stalinist bonds on the populace, was derided by the Russians, who were openly pleased when it failed.

Then in the winter of 1957-58, casting about for a domestic strategy to solve China's terrible problems of industrial and agricultural development, dissatisfied with both the Soviet model and Soviet aid, Mao hit upon the "leap forward" and "people's commune" programs. These programs, relying on an unprecedented mobilization and exploitation of the human material, were clearly obnoxious to Moscow, on both practical and doctrinal grounds. Convinced that these programs were bound to fail, primarily because they slighted material incentives. The Soviet leadership reacted sharply to the ideological and political challenge of the Chinese claim to have found a short cut to Communism applicable to other Communist countries.

The Sino-Soviet dispute on world Communist strategy seems to have originated at about the same time, in divergent Soviet and Chinese assessments of the significance of

Soviet weapons developments. Khrushchev was fairly confident that these developments--particularly the ICBM--effectively deterred the West from general war, but he retained a strong sense of the consequences of general war for the bloc as well as for the West. He thus chose to emphasize the bloc's prospects for making steady gains by non-military means, and for rapid gains when the USSR had surpassed the US in economic productivity as well as military power (in or about 1970). Mao too believed that the West was probably deterred from general war, but, as indicated in his speech of November 1957 at the Moscow conference of Communist parties, he had a much more cheerful view of the consequences of general war for the bloc. Thus Mao was less willing than was Khrushchev for the bloc to compromise in order to avoid the risk of general war, and he favored a more aggressive strategy looking to much more rapid gains, especially in the underdeveloped areas.

Although the scope of the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy was not apparent from the start (and may not yet be), there were indications throughout 1958 and 1959 that a wide range of policies was at issue. In spring 1958, the Chinese party seemed to be trying to force the Soviet party's hand--to more serious actions--in the dispute with Yugoslavia, the center of "revisionism." Concurrently, at a conference of Warsaw Pact powers, the Chinese publicly and scornfully challenged the Soviet estimate of the world balance of forces. In mid-1958, the Chinese seemed to urge a more aggressive course to counter Western actions in the Middle East. In summer and fall 1958, Peiping may have failed to get the kind of Soviet support it wanted for Mao's venture in the Taiwan Strait. Shortly thereafter, Peiping renewed its charges that the CPSU poorly estimated the balance of power, and the Chinese began to play an obstructive role in the world Communist fronts.

In summer 1959, the Chinese began to attack Khrushchev's explorations for a detente with the US, and at the same time seemed to be encouraging revolutionary extremists (against Soviet wishes) in Iraq. In autumn 1959 Peiping publicly criticized Soviet policies with regard to the underdeveloped countries, and again seemed to be trying to force the Soviet hand by putting more pressure on Nasser than Khrushchev wished.

The Soviet party was well aware of this challenge, and it began a counter-offensive in autumn 1959. The Chinese, stung by Khrushchev's speeches in Peiping in October 1959 and in the USSR subsequently, attacked with new fury. By early 1960 the Chinese were presenting themselves as fundamentalist prophets denouncing a comfortable and cynical church. With the publication in April 1960 of a series of unprecedently savage articles in Chinese party publications --which were circulated to other parties--the Chinese positions on substantive issues were virtually complete.

Whereas Moscow conceded that the West was still strong, Peiping disparaged the West and its weapons systems as a "paper tiger." Whereas Moscow spoke of the disastrous consequences of nuclear war for the world, Peiping emphasized the bloc's survival capabilities and its ability to build a new world rapidly. Whereas Moscow emphasized the decreasing possibility of general war, Peiping emphasized US preparations for war and reportedly argued privately that an eventual war was inevitable. Whereas Moscow emphasized the ability of the bloc to deter the West also from local wars and argued that these should in general be avoided due to the danger of their expansion. Peiping contended that such wars were inevitable and should often be welcomed, and it minimized the dangers of expansion. Whereas Moscow promised to support "just wars," the Chinese jeered that Moscow as so afraid of general war that it would not adequately support these "just" wars, not even "liberation" wars.

Further, whereas Moscow insisted that "peaceful coexistence" was the long-term objective of the entire bloc, defining this term as envisaging competition by all means short of war, Peiping argued that the concept misrepresented relations with the West, and that even the militant Soviet interpretation of it impeded the struggle with the West. Similarly, whereas the Soviets contended that there were "realistic" leaders in the West, that negotiations were worthwhile, and that disarmament was both a useful issue and a feasible long-range goal, Peiping charged that Moscow was being gulled by the West, that the emphasis should be on struggle and not on talks, and that disarmament was an "illusion."

Further, whereas Moscow asserted the increasing possibility and desirability of Communist parties coming to power by peaceful means, Peiping argued that violence was almost always both necessary and desirable and that Communist parties must have the courage to employ it.

Further, in policy toward underdeveloped countries, Moscow and Peiping were in important disagreement as to how fast to seek independence for the remaining colonies and semi-colonies (countries regarded as indirectly under imperialist control, like Batista's Cuba), and as to how fast to try to knock over the newly-independent governments and replace them with Communist regimes. Moscow empahsized the need for protracted cooperation with bourgeois nationalist leaders in the newly-independent countries and with bourgeois forces in the countries not yet independent, subordinating the local Communist parties to this end when necessary, while Peiping accused Moscow of exaggerating the importance of the neutrals, emphasized the unreliability of their leaders, called for an effort to bring them down more rapidly, and urged Communist movements in colonial areas to seize leadership of the revolution from the bourgeoisie in its early stages.

Further, whereas Moscow called for a gradualist program, emphasizing Communist cooperation for "democratic" goals, in Western countries, Peiping derided this program as "opportunist" and urged the "revolutionary overthrow" of Western governments.

Finally, whereas Moscow pursued a flexible policy in the world Communist fronts, aimed at enlisting maximum cooperation from non-Communists, Peiping called for the fronts to be "fighting organizations" seeking cooperation only on Communist terms.

The Bucharest Conference, June 1960*

The Soviet party replied publicly to the systematic Chinese attacks of April 1960 in a speech by Kuusinen on 22 April condemning "dogmatic" positions. The rebuke fell on hard ground. Moreover, the failure of the Paris summit meeting in May seemed to the Chinese to justify one of the most important of their positions assailed as "dogmatic"--namely, that little was to be expected from negotiations with the West, and that good Communists should attend to the struggle.

The Chinese were clearly not satisfied by the wrecking of the summit talks. Peiping was seeking, and could not find, signs of a fundamental change in Soviet policy. Indeed, it seems likely that Khrushchev reaffirmed the main lines of his policy in a letter sent to the bloc parties and certain others in late May or early June. The Soviet party is also reported to have sent a letter or letters to the Chinese party at this time, criticizing Chinese positions and calling for a world Communist conference in Bucharest concurrently with the Rumanian party's congress in late June.

The Chinese returned to the offensive at the meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peiping, 5-10 June. The Chinese are reported, preceding the meeting, to have objected strongly to the official WFTU report, which indirectly criticized a number of Chinese positions. At the same time, Liu Shao-chi, at a 3 June dinner for an Albanian delegation (including Liri Belishova, later purged for rejecting the Chinese line), set the tone for the Chinese performance at the WFTU meeting. Liu reiterated Chinese warnings

*The following three sections cover much the same ground, using in part the same materials [redacted] Additional materials have come to hand, however. Moreover, our paper is aimed at a somewhat different audience, and therefore gives greater attention to certain developments and less to others [redacted] paper. Finally, there are certain differences in interpretation, although these are not fundamental.

against being deceived by US tactics, against "unrealistic notions" about the world's "most vicious enemy," about the need for courage in the struggle. Another Chinese leader, welcoming the delegates on 5 June, observed again that "peace cannot be begged for; it can only be won by relying on struggle...."

The leader of the Soviet delegation to the WFTU meeting, speaking on 6 June, was hardly friendly to the West, but he reaffirmed the Soviet adherence to "peaceful coexistence and peaceful negotiations..., striving for a reasonable and mutually acceptable solutions." On the same day, in the guise of "support" of Soviet disarmament proposals of 2 June, Chinese editorial comment conceded the possibility of preventing general war but denied the possibility of eliminating local wars as an "impractical illusion."

Speaking to the WFTU meeting on 7 June, Liu Ning-i called for a "life-and-death struggle" within the terms of "peaceful coexistence," and observed that the imperialists in any case would scrap any agreement they might be forced to conclude. Underlining his point for the operations of the WFTU itself, he observed that "we must draw a clear line between ourselves and the tools of a imperialists," must seek unity through "struggle," not through "compromise."

The following day, in the harshest public speech of the meeting, Liu Chang-sheng called for a policy of exposing the imperialists, struggling with them, giving them "blow for blow." It was "wrong," he said, to oppose war indiscriminately, because local wars were inevitable and the "just" wars among them should be supported. Even with respect to general war, which might be averted, emphasis on the possibility of averting it would prepare the people badly for a war if it came. He reiterated that local wars had been continuous since World War II and that it was "entirely wrong and contrary to fact" to contend that they could be avoided. Liu observed that, while Peiping supported the Soviet disarmament proposal, it was "inconceivable" that the West would disarm, that the proposal was useful only as a device to arouse people to isolate the US, and that any other view was an "illusion." He derided the Soviet view that disarmament would release Western as well as bloc funds for the use of the underdeveloped countries.

Moreover, during the five-day meeting, other Chinese leaders--including Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--had private meetings with various of the delegates and lobbied against Soviet positions. Soviet representatives at the meeting were angered by both the public and the private behavior of the Chinese.

The Soviet party retaliated publicly in articles of 10 and 12 June commenting on the 40th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's "Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder." The 10 June article, in Soviet Russia, invoked Lenin against "leftist sectarian" and "leftist doctrinaire" errors, went on to defend the Soviet policy in underdeveloped countries of protracted Communist cooperation with the national bourgeoisie, noted the leftist errors of the Iraqi Communists in 1959 (an interesting item in an article clearly aimed at the Chinese), and observed further that contemporary "leftwing deviationism" was manifested in opposition to Communist cooperation with non-Communists in working toward common goals, particularly peace.

The 12 June article in Pravda gave greater attention to the Chinese deviation in domestic policies. The "contemporary revisionists"--the Chinese being revisionist rather than dogmatist in this area--tried to find a "particular road of building socialism of their own," and they tried to "jump over entire historic phases." The article went on to deny that the concept of "peaceful coexistence," the effort for disarmament, and negotiations between East and West constituted a "deviation" from orthodoxy.

In mid-June, two Italian Communist delegates to the WFTU meeting which had closed on 10 June publicly identified the Chinese and Indonesians as having taken a divergent line at the WFTU meeting. This was the first time that any bloc spokesman had publicly identified the Chinese as divergent.

Red Flag on 15 June offered some disagreeable remarks. It reminded Khrushchev that he had erred badly in being influenced by President Eisenhower's "nice talk" about peace, and it derided Khrushchev's expressed view that there were some sober-minded leaders in Western countries. It also spoke scornfully of the Soviet view that Western knowledge that general war would be suicidal would deter the West, although the Chinese had conceded this point--at least as a

probability--on other occasions. It was in this editorial that Peiping introduced its little tale of the schoolteacher who trusted the wolf, which upon release tried to eat him but was beaten to death by a "peasant who knew well the man-eating nature of the wolf." (Khrushchev soon snapped back that of course a wolf is a wolf, but a wolf is not a lion.)

Stopping in Moscow on their way to the Bucharest conference, Chinese representatives, led by Peng Chen, had a long discussion with Soviet representatives on 17 June. The Chinese are said to have maintained their righteousness in these discussions, and to have said that they would alter their views only if other parties were to "prove" them wrong--i.e., not simply if outvoted.

People's Daily struck again on 21 June, the day of the opening of the Bucharest conference. It found revolutionary situations everywhere, even in Western Europe, "an arsenal that can explode at any moment." Directly criticizing Yugoslav rather than Soviet positions, the editorial put the Chinese case against Moscow about as neatly--and also as unfairly--as possible: "The essence of modern revisionism is capitulation in the name of peace."

Khrushchev spoke on the first day--21 June--of the Rumanian party congress. He reaffirmed Soviet positions under attack by the Chinese, and he described the opponents of his ideological innovations as persons who "act like children." Peng Chen spoke the following day, and, while still speaking fairly politely, reaffirmed Chinese differences with Moscow on important features of world Communist strategy.

On the same day, the Soviet delegation reportedly began to meet with other delegations to give them a systematic account of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The most important item was a Soviet party letter of about 70 pages, probably dated 21 June, which the other delegations (including the Chinese) were permitted to read in groups.

The Soviet letter of 21 June began by reviewing the long "fraternal cooperation" between the Soviet and Chinese parties and states, and observed sorrowfully that "in recent times" differences had become apparent with regard to questions of

world Communist strategy. This had been shown in the systematic Chinese attacks on Soviet positions in spring 1960 and in Chinese behavior in the world Communist front organizations. After rejecting a Soviet overture for bilateral talks about Sino-Soviet differences, the Chinese had taken anti-Soviet positions at the WFTU conference in Peiping in June 1960. During a dinner at that conference, Liu Shao-chi had spoken of important differences, and Teng Hsiao-ping had gone so far as to charge that the November 1957 declaration of the Communist parties had been jettisoned by the CPSU. Following this, the Chinese party had arranged private talks with other parties, in which they had been critical of Soviet positions, and they had since circulated documents among other parties. Such behavior, in the Soviet view was "improper and unacceptable." The Soviet party would thus, in this letter, state its positions on the "question of principle" (discussed above), the appraisal of the present epoch, questions of war and peace, the concept of "peaceful coexistence," the forms of transition to socialism, and the use of the world Communist fronts.

As for the first substantive question, the Soviet letter insisted that the "main content" of the epoch was the "transition from capitalism to socialism," and it criticized the Chinese adherence to Lenin's description of the current epoch as one of "imperialism, wars and revolution." The Chinese had failed to understand fully the great changes in the world since Lenin's time, reflecting the disintegration of imperialism and the growth of the world socialist system to the point where it could exert a "decisive influence" on international events. The letter denied that the Soviet party was misrepresenting the aggressive character of imperialism and the consequent danger of war, and it asserted that the CPSU had consistently presented imperialism as aggressive. However, it went on, the real point was whether imperialism in present conditions could realize its aggressive plans.

The Soviet position, the letter continued, taking up "questions of war and peace," was that the strength of the bloc effectively deterred the West from war. The Chinese, in denying this, were guilty of overestimating the forces of the West and underestimating those of the bloc.

The letter went on to note--not distinguishing between general and local war--that the contention that war was inevitable was counter-productive, in that it made the people of the world fatalistic and passive. It observed, correctly, that Mao at Moscow in November 1957 had agreed on the necessity for a 15-year period of peace, and it noted that the Chinese party had since changed its mind. It derided Peiping for asserting simultaneously (a) that the West was a "paper tiger" and (b) that the West was so strong it could not be deterred from war.

The Soviet letter at this point denied the Chinese charge that Soviet opposition to general war entailed or implied Soviet opposition to "liberation" wars as well. The letter argued that it had become more difficult for the West to intervene militarily in underdeveloped countries,* and it cited events in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Cuba as examples. "Coexistence" would not deter the USSR from supporting "just" wars as necessary. The letter evaded the question of whether such support would extend to undertaking or seriously risking military conflict with Western forces.

Taking up the third category, the letter stated that "peaceful coexistence" was not a temporary tactical slogan but was instead the "general line" of the bloc, i.e., a long-term objective. The Chinese party was accused of having repudiated an agreement on this point too. The Chinese were further rebuked for conceding the possibility of a "temporary agreement" on disarmament but simultaneously denying the possibility of eliminating wars, and for having stated at the WFTU meeting in June that the concept of disarmament was an "illusion."

The Soviet letter reiterated Moscow's view that a war with modern weapons would have disastrous consequences on a global scale, and that civilization would be set back centuries. The letter expressly rejected Mao's long-standing public position that the "atomic bomb" (as well as the West) was a "paper tiger."

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*This Soviet letter apparently did not distinguish here between "local" wars and "liberation" wars.

The letter went on to deny the Chinese charge that "peaceful coexistence" would impede the struggle with the West. On the contrary, the letter said, coexistence would facilitate the struggle everywhere.

The letter defended Soviet policy toward "bourgeois nationalist" leaders such as those of India, Indonesia, Iraq, Burma, Ceylon, and Cuba. The neutrality of these countries, it said, which inter alia denied the United States bases, objectively served the bloc. The letter went on to reject the Chinese charge that these bourgeois nationalist leaders were backsliding toward imperialism, and it reaffirmed the Soviet position that the bloc should not look to the early overthrow of such leaders. The Chinese were again rebuked for changing their minds--this time on the question of the importance of neutrals in the struggle.

As for dealing with the West within the terms of "peaceful coexistence," the Soviet letter reaffirmed the Soviet position that there were two tendencies in the West--the bellicose and the relatively realistic. The existence of the latter permitted the bloc to use the instrument of negotiations effectively. Moreover, the letter said, the prospects for a negotiated disarmament were not bad, because the Soviet "edge" in military power meant that the West "had to listen." Further, because existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons could "wipe out the world," all peoples of the world had an interest in disarmament, an interest which permitted new successes in mass movements. The letter conceded the difficulty of reaching a disarmament agreement, but it argued that efforts to reach one would be to the bloc's advantage in several respects; and it rejected the Chinese charge that this effort was incompatible with prosecution of the over-all struggle, especially in the underdeveloped areas.

The Soviet letter than turned again to the critical question of local wars, rejecting a view put forward by the Chinese that there was a "third way" in addition to the alternatives of coexistence and general war--namely, continued cold war with occasional local wars. The letter reaffirmed the Soviet view that local wars could easily get out of control and therefore should be avoided, or at least not publicly advocated. (Again it did not distinguish "liberation" wars.)

Taking up the fourth category, forms of "transition to socialism," the letter rejected the Chinese charge that Moscow had overemphasized the possibility of peaceful accession to power by Communist parties. The letter did this, however, by misrepresenting the Chinese position--attributing to the CCP the charge, easy to refute, that the Soviet party had said that peaceful accession was the "only" way. The Chinese party was again accused of having repudiated a onetime agreement--that both peaceful and non-peaceful paths to power were to be expected.

The Soviet letter then turned to the fifth category, the question of the proper use of the world Communist fronts. It gave a number of instances of Chinese obstructionist activity in the fronts in the preceding nine months, and it reached way back to 1949 for an instance of the CCP having acted unilaterally--in this case, at the Asian Trade Unions conference in Peiping in 1949 at which the Chinese called for "armed struggle" as the principal form of Communist action in Asia wherever possible.* In their attitude toward the fronts, the Chinese party was again accused of having departed from a onetime agreement.

The Soviet letter then returned to what it had earlier called the "question of principle," i.e. the discipline of the world Communist movement, relating it here to Chinese failure to adhere to the Moscow declaration of the Communist parties, and the accompanying Peace Manifesto, of November 1957. These departures for the most part related to the disputed issues on world Communist strategy already reviewed. However, the Soviet party additionally rebuked the Chinese party, under this rubric, for continuing to raise the question of the stature of Stalin, for criticizing the Soviet party behind its back (apparently on various issues), for a dogmatic attitude toward Marxism-Leninism, for criticizing as "opportunist" the Rome declaration of the European Communist parties (which had endorsed the Soviet gradualist

* The Soviet charge that the Chinese action was unilateral may be correct, even though Soviet comment at the time seemed to approve the recommended strategy. There was also the question of a larger Chinese role than advisable in Soviet eyes.

strategy for Western Europe), and, again, for not dealing directly with the Soviet party but instead dealing surreptitiously with other parties and their representatives.

Because the substantive issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute had in general been apparent to or surmised by both Western and (probably) world Communist observers before the circulation of this Soviet letter of 21 June (see the introductory section of this paper), the most interesting portion of the letter was its conclusion, in which the Soviet party clearly implied that Chinese persistence in misbehavior would be costly to Peiping. This section began by remarking the damage to the world Communist movement that the Chinese had caused, described Chinese behavior as "disloyal and uncomradely,"* observed that the Chinese nominally recognized Soviet leadership but disregarded and attacked it in practice, noted that the Chinese party had rejected repeated overtures for bilateral discussions, and gave instances of Soviet "tact" in refraining from openly criticizing certain Chinese domestic policies.

This concluding section of the Soviet letter then reviewed the "tremendous" material aid--economic and military aid--the USSR had supplied to China. Expressing an intention to do everything possible to overcome the difficulties with China "without sacrificing principles," and reminding the Chinese that Sino-Soviet dissension could only benefit the imperialist common enemy, the letter concluded with an expression of confidence that the CCP would "draw the necessary conclusions"--bearing in mind that the interests of the world Communist movement were inseparable from the interests of "building Communism" in China itself. In other words, unless the Chinese party backed down, the Soviet party would reduce its assistance to China.

The Soviet delegation apparently followed up its briefing (with the above letter) of the other delegations with a bloc party meeting to draft a communiqué. The communiqué, dated 24 June but not issued until 28 June, was short, thin,

ambiguous, and obviously unsatisfactory, reaffirming the November 1957 declaration which the parties interpreted very differently. The Chinese signed the communiqué after getting permission from Peiping.

On 25 June, after the Rumanian party congress had closed, delegates from all the parties (about 50) represented at Bucharest met for "discussion" of the communiqué--i.e., were lined up by the Soviet party to state their support of Soviet positions. Some 19 delegates reportedly spoke before the Chinese first spoke. [redacted] representatives of the parties of France, Syria, Argentina, Turkey, East Germany, Austria, Spain, Morocco, Uruguay, Belgium, the United States and Chile gave substantial support to Soviet positions and were critical of the Chinese. Judging from certain vague or evasive formulations in this same account, the delegates from some of the following parties--Italy, England, Japan, Iran, Cyprus, Indonesia, and Finland--may have tried to take a neutral position, simply endorsing the communiqué and calling for unity.

Peng Chen, the first Chinese speaker, is reported to have taken note of the criticism, to have described it as in large part "unjust," and to have asked for more careful consideration of the Chinese point of view. He defended specific foreign and domestic policies of the Peiping regime.

At about this time, possibly between this meeting and the one the following day, the Chinese reportedly inserted a document of their own into the proceedings. This seems to have been a translation of another long (about 80-page) letter from the Soviet party of the Chinese party--presumably the letter of late May or early June. [redacted] this letter as having been sharply critical of the Chinese positions and actions, the Chinese motive was presumably that of gaining sympathy by showing how extreme the Soviet criticism had been.

At the 26 June meeting, some 11 delegates reportedly spoke before Khrushchev first spoke of these, the delegates from (at least) the parties of Brazil, Cuba and Canada seem to have supported the Soviet party and to have criticized the Chinese. The positions of the delegates of the parties of Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece, India,

Colombia, Algeria, Albania, and Venezuela are less clear, but, of these, the Indian, Albanian, and Venezuelan delegates seem to have been neutral or nearly so, with the Albanian leaning to the Chinese.

Khrushchev then spoke, reviewing some of the charges in the CPSU's 21 June letter and perhaps also some of those contained in the earlier Soviet letter the Chinese had just made available, and perhaps making some fresh charges. With respect to bloc strategy, he is said to have criticized Chinese positions on the balance of power, on local wars, on "peaceful coexistence," on policy toward underdeveloped countries (with considerable detail on the Sino-Indian border dispute), and on the world Communist fronts. With respect to domestic policies, he is said to have criticized the "great leap forward," the backyard steel campaign and the commune program, and to have added a charge of Chinese failure to cooperate in certain common defense projects--apparently related to air-warning systems, naval communications, submarine bases, the stationing in China of Soviet nuclear weapons crews, or some combination of these matters. Further, he is said to have cited Chinese collusion with elements of other parties, specifically in Latin America, and Chinese intransigence on deStalinization. He is said also to have attacked Mao personally for being as vain and insular as Stalin had been.

Peng Chen is reported to have replied in kind. Although the details of Peng's speech, like Khrushchev's, are uncertain, various reports suggest that he reiterated Chinese criticism of Soviet underestimation of the possibility (or, perhaps, the eventual necessity) of general war,* of Soviet misrepresentation of the character of the West, of Soviet overevaluation of the importance of neutral countries, of Soviet failure to give sufficient support to "liberation" movements (the Algerian rebels were specified), of Soviet disfavor for Chinese domestic programs (and Soviet efforts to prevent other parties from adopting similar programs), of Soviet niggardliness in supplying economic aid and of Soviet failure to provide either nuclear weapons or sufficient information relating to the production of them, of Soviet presumption in speaking for Peiping in

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* [redacted] Peng at first argued that general war was inevitable, and that he then retreated, presumably without changing his mind.

international bodies (it is not clear what bodies were meant), of Soviet paternalism toward the Chinese party, and of Soviet efforts to interfere in Chinese relationships with other parties (especially in Asia). Peng is said also to have charged the Soviet party with organizing the Bucharest meeting to discredit the Chinese party, and to have retaliated for Khrushchev's personal attack on Mao with the assertion that the Chinese party had no confidence in Khrushchev or in his policies, indeed that Khrushchev had "betrayed" Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and those who had remained faithful to them.

Following these exchanges, other delegates are said to have spoken. The great majority of them gave at least general support to the Soviet party. At least one delegation, however, the Albanian, is credibly reported to have supported the Chinese, and others apparently indicated some degree of sympathy for the Chinese. On the same day, 26 June, agreement was reached to hold another conference in Moscow in November 1960, and a commission was set up to prepare for it.

Moscow Applies Pressure, Summer 1960

[redacted] the Chinese party sent a stinging letter to the Soviet party during the first week of July. [redacted] the Chinese letter, after reaffirming some Chinese positions on general and local war, concluded with a threat that, unless the Soviet party altered its positions or changed its attitude, Peiping would expel Soviet technicians and publicly renounce Soviet economic aid.

[redacted]

Two days after the publication of the innocuous Bucharest communique, i.e. on 29 June, Pravda and People's Daily commented editorially on the communique. While neither editorial was offensive in tone, neither was conciliatory. The Soviet editorial was principally concerned with giving the false impression that the Soviet party had the full support of the world Communist movement. The Chinese editorial was mainly directed to the continuing danger of "revisionism."

In early July, the Soviet party apparently directed Soviet and Bloc informational media to begin to play down Communist China. The Soviet home service ceased to comment on Chinese affairs on 11 July, an action reminiscent of the boycott of Yugoslavia in spring 1948.

At the same time, the Soviet party reportedly informed the Chinese party (6 July) that the Chinese Russian-language magazine Druzhba, circulated in the USSR, had contained offensive material (propaganda for Chinese as opposed to Soviet positions), that it must therefore be suspended, and that the comparable Soviet Chinese-language magazine (Su Chung Yu Hao) circulated in Communist China would be suspended. The note may or may not have referred also the Chinese Russian-language pictorial, Kitai, which for a time thereafter failed to appear.

The CPSU central committee met in plenum for five days in mid-July and on 16 July adopted a resolution on the results of the Bucharest conference. The resolution "completely approved" the line that had been taken by the Soviet delegation at Bucharest and charged the Chinese--without naming them publicly--with "leftwing sectarian deviation" and narrow nationalism."

As had Pravda earlier, the resolution sought to make it appear that the Bucharest meeting had endorsed the theses of the CPSU's 20th and 21st congresses and that the delegations had fully supported Soviet positions in the Bucharest debate. Following the plenum, meetings were organized all over the USSR to discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute. At one of these meetings, Suslov is plausibly reported to have described the dispute as very serious, and to have said that it might lead to a break in party relations and that additional Soviet economic aid to Peiping would not be justified.

In the same period Kommunist No. 10 (signed to the press on 11 July, presumably appearing in the last two weeks of July), undertook an elaborate refutation of positions taken publicly by the Chinese party in spring 1960 and privately at the Bucharest conference. The authors cited Lenin as ridiculing "dogmatists and doctrinaires," insisted on a "creative" interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, asserted that Khrushchev had provided such an interpretation of Lenin's alleged expectation of a "decisive" socialist influence on questions of war and peace, reaffirmed the importance of economic competition in the East-West struggle, and rejected Chinese charges that the Soviet interpretation of "peaceful coexistence" would weaken the bloc in the struggle, that emphasis on the possibility of peaceful accession to power by Communist parties would encourage "illusions," and that calls for "mutual concessions" and "compromises" between East and West were unworthy of Leninists.

The heaviest Soviet blow in the Sino-Soviet dispute--a blow calculated to have greater impact on Peiping than all the Soviet editorials and speeches put together--came in the form of Soviet letters to the Chinese party on 21 and 25 July about the status of Soviet technicians in China.* In the first letter, the Soviet party reportedly referred to a Soviet request of 1956-57 that the Soviet technicians be replaced by Chinese who had been trained in the bloc (the Soviets, however, had agreed to let them stay), cited a Soviet willingness to withdraw them in 1958 when the Chinese had complained about some of them, and charged that the Chinese had recently been subverting the technicians by circulating among them material of the type originated by the Chinese in spring 1960. It is

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not clear whether this first letter stated an intention to withdraw the technicians. In any case, the 25 July letter reportedly stated that "all" technicians would be withdrawn in the period from late July to early September. Perhaps not all, but virtually all seem to have been in fact withdrawn by mid early September.

The Soviet party then and subsequently denied that the withdrawal of technicians was an application of severe pressure on the Chinese party to force the Chinese to back down in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Obviously that was what it was, however. The withdrawal was bound to have such a serious effect on the Chinese program of economic and military development--grossly disrupting the existing program--that it could have been taken only for the most serious of reasons, i.e. the entire matter of the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, not simply the indoctrination of the technicians. The action underlined indications that Khrushchev was willing to risk a break with Peiping. The question was simply that of whether the pressure would be effective.

The Chinese party reportedly replied on 1 August to the 25 July Soviet letter. The Chinese letter is said to have expressed astonishment at the Soviet decision to withdraw the technicians, praised the work of the technicians, asserted that Peiping had in general been responsive to their advice, and minimized the charge of indoctrination of the technicians. The letter went on to protest strongly that the Soviet decision was legally and morally wrong and that it would hurt the Chinese development program, weaken the bloc, and encourage the West. The letter concluded with a request--which Moscow ignored--for reconsideration of the decision.

In this same letter of 1 August, Peiping reportedly took up the question of stoppage of Chinese and Soviet "friendship" publications, about which Moscow had informed Peiping on 6 July. The Chinese letter contended that the Soviet publication had also contained offensive material but Peiping had not objected. It went on to remark that it was "curious" that Amerika could circulate in the USSR but the Chinese publication could not. It concluded with a request that the Soviet decision to stop the publications, like the decision to withdraw the technicians, be reconsidered.

The Soviet party remained on the offensive throughout August. Pravda on 7 August, defending Soviet views on war and peace, described Chinese Communist views (not attributed) on these questions as an "absolute departure" from Marxism-Leninism. Soviet Fleet on 9 August, in the first observed public warning of this kind, reminded Peiping that it was "impossible" for a country to achieve socialism without close ties with and "brotherly help" from the Bloc; this article went on to explain the forms of the struggle within the concept of "peaceful coexistence." Red Star on 12 August jeered at "dogmatists and sectarians" who "mechanically repeat" the once-valid thesis that wars are inevitable so long as capitalism exists; and at the same time, as had Soviet Fleet, it rejected the Chinese charge that the USSR was attempting to "beg" peace. Pravda on 12 August derided "publicists" who selectively quoted Lenin (which, of course, both parties had done from the start), and it defended coexistence as a means of facilitating the East-West struggle on all fronts. On 13 August, an Izvestia article on the same theme charged the Chinese (not named) with having drawn "absolutely absurd" conclusions from recent international developments, and, further, with having disoriented themselves and misled others.

Beginning on 16 August, the Soviet provincial press widely published an article which for the first time named China in the context of the dispute and for the first time warned China specifically of the consequences of isolation from the Bloc:

> Could one imagine the successful construction of socialism in present-day conditions even in such a great country as, let us say, China, if this country were in an isolated position, not relying on the cooperation and mutual assistance of all the other socialist countries? Being subjected to economic blockade on the part of the capitalist countries, such a country at the same time would be subjected to military blows from without. It would experience the greatest difficulties even if it were able to withstand the furious attack of the enemy...

Soviet Russia on 17 August criticized the dogmatists who believed in the inevitability of wars, and expressly derided the Chinese contention that the Western general staffs were to make this decision. On 25 August, a Bulgarian paper reiterated the warnings about isolation, and, of greater interest,

observed that "any kind of 'second center' of the revolutionary movement...would, in effect, help imperialism." On 26 August, Pravda denounced "dogmatists and sectarians" who criticized Soviet policies toward underdeveloped countries--with respect both to nationalist governments and to "liberation" movements--and who were thus approaching "self-isolation." And on 30 August Pravda Ukrainy, ridiculing some Chinese formulations taken verbatim, warned that efforts to "sow mistrust" of Soviet positions constituted "deviation..., dogmatism and sectarianism" and could cause "serious damage" to the world Communist movement.

Moreover, the Soviet party in August increased its effort to isolate the Chinese party. Many other Communist parties, probably including all those named (the Chinese among them) to the preparatory commission for the forthcoming November conference, received in late August a Soviet party letter reportedly dated 13 August. The letter appears to have been an updated version of the 21 June letter which the Soviet delegation had used for briefing purposes at Bucharest. Reports refer to such issues--outlined in the letter--as the possibility of avoiding general war, the usefulness of "peaceful coexistence," the degree of success of Soviet policies toward the governments of underdeveloped countries, Peiping's relationships with Communist parties of Asia and Africa, Chinese approaches to other parties throughout the world, Chinese interference in bloc affairs, Chinese pressure for nuclear weapons, Chinese domestic programs, the stature of Mao as a theorist, the relative dangers of "revisionism" and "dogmatism," and so on along familiar lines. The letter reportedly called for a serious effort to resolve these differences as rapidly as possible, and described the Moscow conference scheduled for November as the "first opportunity" to do this. The letter in effect invited the recipients to consider the issues and to come to Moscow in November prepared to support the Soviet party. The letter may also have asked the parties to make their views known to Peiping before November, as there are unconfirmed reports that some of them did so.

Chinese Communist pronouncements throughout July had been comparatively circumspect and inoffensive, and they remained so in early August. On 5 August, however, four days after the Chinese party had sent its letter expressing dismay over the Soviet decisions on the technicians and the publications, an arresting article appeared in the Shanghai bi-weekly Liberation, the organ of the Shanghai Committee of the CCP.

The theme of the article was the need for bitter struggle in the face of the problems posed by a backward country, by the frank opposition of the imperialist enemy, and by those who "call us fools who do not know our limitations." It derided those who "would have us merely stretch out our hands for aid," and it emphasized the need for self-reliance. Similarly, on the same day (5 August), People's Daily, in reprinting an article which in its original form had emphasized the importance of Soviet aid in Chinese successes, altered the article to downgrade this factor and deleted the passage which had called for "international solidarity" to be the "starting-point" of Chinese actions. Both articles, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, suggested at least the possibility that the Chinese party, rather than deciding to retreat under pressure, had decided to do without Soviet aid if necessary.

People's Daily in Peiping reprinted the 5 August Liberation article on 13 August, and on the same day the newspaper's editorial found occasion to cite the "blasphemous talk" of "modern revisionists and their followers" who took anti-Chinese positions. In mid-August, Li Fu-chun, the regime's principal econimic planner, had an article in Red Flag reiterating the Chinese policy of "self-reliance." Li wrote that the party had "consistently held that we should rely mainly on our own efforts. This was so in the past and will be even more so in the future." Li also assailed "modern revisionists," described the Chinese as "real Marxist-Leninists" and asserted that those seeking to isolate Peiping would only isolate themselves. On 30 August, possibly in reply to the 26 August Pravda article, the Chinese party renewed its criticism of Soviet policy in underdeveloped countries, emphasizing the need to support Communist movements there, describing Soviet policy as a "violation" of Lenin's views and Mao's line as "entirely" consonant with Lenin's views.

The strongest indication of a Chinese intention to stand firm in the dispute came in early September at the Viet Minh party congress in Hanoi, on which occasion the Soviet and Chinese representatives stated their views, as someone has said, "at point-blank range." On 6 September, Soviet delegate Mukhitdinov reaffirmed Soviet positions on the non-inevitability of wars, the wicked character but declining strength of imperialism, the need for "peaceful coexistence" as conforming with the "humanitarian nature of socialism" (a concept bitterly attacked in a Chinese article two days earlier) the excellence

of Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped countries, and so on. Li Fu-chun followed Mukhitdinov with a reaffirmation of certain divergent Chinese positions, concluding with the sour observation that "we must not take the struggle against dogmatism as a pretext for departing from fundamental theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism, nor allow Marxism-Leninism to be replaced by revisionism." Mukhitdinov, angered, struck back hard in another speech on 11 September, attributing to "revisionists" one of the positions taken in fact by the Chinese (on the inevitability of wars), and going on to denounce the "divisive activities of the dogmatists and sectarians" (the conventional terms for the Chinese) as a "serious danger" to the world Communist movement.

Peiping States Its Case, September 1960

On 10 September, the Chinese party sent to the Soviet party a very long (reportedly 150-page) letter designed to refute the Soviet briefing letter of 21 June. The 10 September letter, [redacted] was outlined to other Communist delegates at the Viet Minh party conference in early September, as a counter to the Soviet effort in August to line up the other parties against the Chinese. The CCP may later have sent copies to the other parties.*

The 10 September letter was organized on the pattern of the 21 June Soviet letter, in the interest of systematically refuting the charges in that letter. It took up first the question of relations between the Soviet and Chinese parties and then went into the substantive issues in the dispute. This letter, like the 21 June letter, is worth considering at some length.

The Chinese letter, like the Soviet letter, began by citing the Marxist-Leninist basis of the Sino-Soviet relationship and expressing the CCP's gratitude for Soviet aid. It then observed that there was currently a "crisis" in the relationship, that at the Bucharest meeting Khrushchev had made grave accusations against the CCP, and that this had been followed by a press campaign, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, the suspension of Chinese publications, and the expulsion of a Chinese official from Moscow.

The letter observed that the Soviet letter of 21 June had contained valid points but also a number of views which diverged from Marxism-Leninism and from the Moscow Declaration of November 1957; further, that it had distorted the Chinese position and made unfounded accusations, in particular that the CCP had departed from the Moscow Declaration.

The Chinese letter went on to note that serious differences had begun with the CPSU Congress in February 1956 when

*We are here relying primarily on an excellent [redacted] it should be recognized that certain passages might be interpreted differently [redacted]

the Soviet party had made a surprised attack on Stalin, neglecting his role as a builder of socialism and defender of Marxism, and when the CPSU had also put forward an incorrect theory on the "peaceful transition to socialism" without having first consulted other Communist parties.

In October 1956, the letter went on, the USSR had mobilized forces to move against Poland and had desisted only after representations by the CCP. Further, the Chinese party had deterred Moscow from arranging an international meeting to condemn the Polish leaders. Immediately thereafter, the letter said, the Soviet party was about to withdraw its forces from Hungary at a critical point in the uprising, and it was the CCP which had induced the Soviet party to crush the uprising.

Then at the Moscow conference in November 1957, the letter went on, the Chinese party had impelled significant revisions in the draft of the 12-party declaration. The Soviet draft had not mentioned the questions of state power or of class struggle, it had spoken only of peaceful paths. The CCP, in its formulation, had agreed to show a link with the Soviet 20th Congress formulation in order to save Moscow's face.

Also at Moscow, the letter continued, Mao Tse-tung had endorsed the concept of Soviet leadership of the socialist camp. However, the leader must behave responsibly, must have proper discussion with all other parties on an "equal basis." (It is not clear whether Mao made these latter points at Moscow.)

The CCP, the 10 September letter continued, had adhered to the agreed procedure of bilateral talks with the Soviet party from 1957 to 1960. However, the Soviet party had deviated from agreed positions and had returned to the mistaken theses of the 20th Congress, and, particularly after September 1959 (following Khrushchev's visit to the United States), the CPSU had made open criticisms of the Chinese party. As instances of deviations and improper behavior, the letter cited Khrushchev's position on the Sino-Indian dispute, several of Khrushchev's speeches in the USSR in autumn 1959, Khrushchev's criticism of the Leap Forward and the commune programs, Khrushchev's assertion of Chinese "adventurism" in both foreign and domestic policies, Khrushchev's derision of Mao as an "old and insensitive" man to be discarded like worn-out slippers,

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Khrushchev's comparison of the Chinese to Troskyists, Khrushchev's "embellishment" of American imperialism and President Eisenhower, Kuusinen's 22 April article and so on. Thus, the Chinese letter continued, the CCP had published three articles--the group of April 1960--to set forth its own point of view.

At the WFTU meeting in June 1960, the letter went on, it was apparent that there were serious differences in points of view on matters of strategy and consequently on the proper line for the world Communist fronts, relating in general to the intensity and methods of the "struggle" with the West. Moreover, the WFTU Secretary's report had been very offensive in mentioning the free world without quotation marks but setting such marks about the Chinese "leap forward" and "commune" programs. The Chinese delegates had been impelled to talk with other delegations, yes, but this procedure contrasted favorably with Khrushchev's actions in openly criticizing the Chinese and trying to impose his opinion.

As for the Bucharest conference, the letter went on, the CCP had agreed to the CPSU's 2 June proposal for an international meeting but asked for more time to prepare for it. The CPSU had agreed, and had promised that the meeting would involve an exchange of views rather than seek a definitive reasolution of differences. However, at Bucharest the Soviet party and Khrushchev had launched a surprise attack on the CCP, and had followed this with a press campaign.

The Chinese letter at this point took up the first substantive category, the nature of the present epoch. The Chinese party did not hold, the letter said, that the epoch was one "exclusively" of "imperialism, wars, and revolution"; the CCP agreed that the main characteristic of the epoch was that the forces of socialism were prevailing over those of capitalism; Mao had long ago said that the East Wind was prevailing. This did not mean, however, that fundamentals of Leninism had become archaic. In this connection, it was the CPSU, not the CCP, which had deviated from the Moscow declaration. The letter again cited some of Khrushchev's formulations about banishing war, about a world without arms, about disarmament freeing funds for underdeveloped countries, about resources in Western countries being used for popular welfare, about Western leaders genuinely desiring peace, about "coexistence" being

exclusively a peaceful competition, and about the danger of local wars (including "liberation" wars) leading to general war, with consequent Soviet timidity in supporting "just" wars and Soviet wishful thinking about peaceful accessions to power. The Soviet party's and Khrushchev's views in these respects were described as non-Marxist.

The Chinese letter agreed that it was worthwhile to attempt to prevent a new world war and to struggle for disarmament, although it rejected the slogan of a world without arms, armed forces, and wars. In this connection, however, the Soviet party was exaggerating the bloc's control over the actions of the West, that imperialism would continue to prepare for war, and that the need for vigilance would continue. Imperialism being imperialism, the letter said, it would never abandon its efforts to dominate by violence, nor would it aid underdeveloped countries, nor would it promote the welfare of the working classes.

Thus, this section of the letter concluded, there were two concepts of the nature of the epoch: one was that of Marxism-Leninism, the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, and the Chinese party; the other was that which rejected Marxist-Leninist analysis and which was held by Khrushchev and others.

Turning to the second category, questions of war and peace, the Chinese letter rejected Soviet charges that the Chinese party considered general war inevitable and disarmament an "illusion," and that the CCP was "bellicose," "leftist," and "adventurist." The letter reiterated that the CCP agreed on the necessity to prevent general war and to prohibit nuclear weapons. However, the letter went on, the CCP did not believe in the possibility of total disarmament. Moreover, to believe in the possibility of avoiding general war was not the same thing as to believe in the elimination of local wars, "liberation" wars and civil wars.

Returning to the subject of general war, the Chinese letter reiterated that the Soviet party underestimated the need for vigilance. In this connection, the CPSU had transformed the non-inevitability of war into something like the inevitability of avoiding war. The Soviet line was dangerous, because, if general war were to come, the people would be very poorly prepared for it. The letter reiterated that the bloc could not have confidence that the West, even recognizing its relative weakness, would decide against general war.

Moreover, the Chinese letter continued, the CCP had been accused of underestimating the strength of the Bloc, strength which allegedly would influence the West in the direction of good sense. If Khrushchev really had confidence in the bloc, he would strengthen it, rather than weakening it by attacking China and withdrawing Soviet technicians. If Khrushchev really had confidence in the people, Moscow would support their struggle, rather than encouraging illusions about imperialist aid and the possibility of peaceful accession to power. If Khrushchev really did not overestimate (the good sense of?) the West, he would not have illusions about the results of summit meetings and other conferences. If Khrushchev and his party really did not underestimate the strength of the bloc, they would emphasize that a new war would mean the death of imperialism, rather than informing bloc peoples of the horrors of nuclear war. In this connection, the letter said, Khrushchev sometimes declared that a new war would mean the triumph of socialism, but "he does not really believe it." The letter went on to illustrate with quotations Khrushchev's "pessimistic viewpoint." The letter reaffirmed the Chinese view that, after a new war, victorious socialism would build a beautiful future on the ruins of imperialism--not on the ruins of mankind.

The letter went on to object to Soviet criticism of Mao's description of imperialism and modern weapons as "paper tigers." The objective of Mao's concept, the letter said, was to strengthen the "faith" of the people, not to incite adventurist actions. Mao's concept, which he had reaffirmed at Moscow in 1957, called for the bloc to despise the enemy strategically (long-term) while respecting him tactically (short-term)--a concept similar to Lenin's description of Anglo-French imperialism in 1917. As evidence, the letter went on, Peiping had not been provoked unto any rash action against Taiwan, thus demonstrating its tactical respect for the enemy.

In sum, this section of the letter concluded, there were "differences of principle" between Moscow and Peiping on questions of peace and war--differences deriving from the fact that the CCP had adhered to the Moscow Declaration of November 1957 whereas the Soviet party had departed from it.

Taking up the third category, "peaceful coexistence," the Chinese letter of 10 September denied that the CCP advocated a third way--i.e. neither hot war nor peaceful coexistence, but

continued cold war. However, the letter continued, since World War II there had in fact been neither general war nor peaceful coexistence, but a state of cold war which had to be recognized. Khrushchev had admitted this himself.

The letter rejected the charge that the CCP no longer valued alliances between the bloc and the Afro-Asian neutrals, and that Peiping was opposed to the policy of "unity and struggle" with the national bourgeoisie of those countries. However, the letter continued, the Soviet position was self-contradictory: Moscow recognized that bourgeois nationalist leaders could not carry out the class struggle to the end, but it denied that the continuing class struggle would conflict with bourgeois nationalist policies*; Moscow supported the concept of "unity and struggle," but it had failed to support Peiping in the disagreement with Indian leaders. The letter reiterated the Chinese view that bourgeois nationalist leaders were not reliable, with regard to either domestic progress or opposition to imperialism, and again, by implication, it called for greater support to Communist forces in these countries--forces which would emphasize "unity" at this time but would attempt to bring these leaders down as soon as possible.

The letter went on to define a Marxist-Leninist view of "peaceful coexistence"--namely, struggle between the two camps by all means short of war between them, with "peaceful coexistence" itself as "one of the forms of this struggle." Khrushchev had distorted this concept with his emphasis on peaceful competition, to the point of renouncing the "most fundamental struggle, the political battle."** Khrushchev, the letter went on, had gone so far as to envisage "active cooperation" between the camps in some fields, and to describe "peaceful coexistence" as the "highest form" of class struggle.

The letter observed at this point that the Soviet party seemed to apply the concept of "peaceful coexistence" to the struggle of peoples within the non-Communist world. Whereas the Soviet letter had declared Soviet support for "just" wars, Khrushchev himself had emphasized the danger of a local war

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**It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that this Chinese version of Khrushchev's position shows very little sense of the aggressive elements in his interpretation.

becoming a world war. In other words, in the interest of "peaceful coexistence," the Soviet party was advising the "people" everywhere not to undertake any action which might conceivably become a civil war which in turn could become a world war. What was to become then of support of just wars, especially "liberation" wars? Was the Soviet party seriously contending that the victory of the people in the struggle against imperialism depended not on their own struggle but on diplomatic relations between the two camps?

This section of the letter concluded scornfully that, while the Soviet party asserted that the bloc must "force" the West to accept coexistence, "what is actually occurring" with increasing frequency is "concession, complacency, tolerance, and compromise." The letter conceded that concession and compromise were acceptable under certain conditions, but, until the West, especially the United States, discarded its policies of aggression and war, then the "struggle for peaceful coexistence" would necessarily be identical with the struggle against aggression and war. Lenin and Stalin had never tried to "embellish" imperialism and have never regarded the unmasking of an aggressor as an error, whereas Khrushchev and his comrades, at a time when the USSR was more powerful than ever before, chose to ignore the faults of the West and to charge the Chinese with being "bellicose."

Taking up the fourth category, the problem of "peaceful transition" (accession to power), the Chinese letter of 10 September expressed a difference of both "opinion" and "principle" with the Soviet position. The letter charged Moscow with evading the key questions of establishing a proletarian dictatorship and smashing the existing state machinery. It reiterated that power could not be established simply through parliaments. Khrushchev failed to recognize that reactionary forces would always resist strongly, that violence would almost always be necessary. Khrushchev's view, the letter went on, would not deceive the reactionaries, it would merely lull the Communist parties.

This section of the Chinese letter concluded with a rebuke to Soviet "slander" of the CCP as dogmatists who wished to "export revolution," launch a world war, and destroy humanity--simply because the CCP emphasized the need to be prepared for violence in revolution. The Soviet attitude was dismissed scornfully as "fear of revolution--the fundamental principle of opportunists."

Turning to the fifth category, the use of the fronts, the Chinese letter defined the Sino-Soviet dispute on this point as essentially that of whether the fronts were to be fighting organizations. The letter at this point took up the Soviet charge that the CCP in 1949, at the Asian Trade Union Conference, had tried to impose its views; the letter argued that the Chinese had merely offered their experience, and had not proposed that the WFTU itself organize armed struggles. The letter defended at some length the CCP's relations with the WFTU since that time and then accused the Soviet party of having failed to understand the important role the fronts could play in the anti-imperialist and pro-liberation struggles. Indeed, the letter said, the Soviets were even bidding for the support of bourgeois pacifists and those with "colonial ideas," thus isolating themselves from the masses. In sum, Moscow wanted to use the fronts simply as an adjunct of Soviet diplomacy. This section of the letter concluded with instances of Soviet misbehavior and Chinese rectitude.

Turning to the final category, and dividing it into the question of "revisionism and dogmatism" and the question of relations among Communist parties, the Chinese letter denied that revisionism had been eradicated in the bloc, and asserted that revisionism remained in the form of both bourgeois influence in internal affairs and fear of imperialism in foreign affairs. As for the Soviet charge against the CCP of dogmatism and sectarianism, the letter declared flatly that "the CCP does not commit dogmatic and sectarian errors." The letter denied that the "hundred flowers" experiment and the later "leap forward" and commune programs were "heresies." The letter charged that the Soviet wanted the Chinese to "follow blindly" Soviet experience, and that Khrushchev at Bucharest had "supported the rightist opportunist" Peng Te-huai (the defense minister removed in 1959). What Khrushchev called dogmatism, this section concluded roundly, was in reality Marxism-Leninism, whereas what Khrushchev was doing was what right-opportunists always did.

As for relations between the parties, the letter went on, the CCP warmly welcomed the Soviet wish for "solidarity" and asserted that the Chinese party was firmly pro-Soviet and recognized the Soviet party as the "center" of the movement. However, the letter went on, this implied a relationship of "equality and fraternity," not of superior to subordinates or

leader to led. Soviet party resolutions, the letter continued, were not "binding" on other parties.

The CPSU sought to justify itself, the letter continued, by appealing to majority support for its "position." However, it was not always possible to determine "who is right and who is wrong" by counting votes. Truth is truth, the letter said, and a "temporary" majority could not convert error into truth. The letter apparently included at this point an assertion that the "verdict of history" would vindicate Peiping in the dispute. The letter reiterated Chinese opposition (expressed in 1956-57 with regard to Eastern European developments) to "great-nation chauvinism" and paternalistic procedure.

The Chinese letter of 10 September concluded with an expression of gratitude for Soviet aid to China, noting at once, however, that "China paid for all of this aid." Further, the letter observed, the aid of socialist countries to other countries and to revolutionary forces should not be the ground for "pride and boasting." Most sharply, the letter stated at this point that, if economic and technical aid were used as a "means of pressure" between fraternal socialist countries (as Moscow was using it), proletarian internationalism was being violated. The letter declared that this unilateral Soviet action had caused "serious damage" to China. However, the letter declared grandly, "Marxist-Leninist truth cannot be bought with money." The letter concluded with a pious sentiment about the Chinese objective of "unity with brothers" who "travel in the same boat against wind and rain."

Shortly after dispatching this letter to the Soviet party, the Peiping regime, in a 13 September letter to Lumumba forces in the Congo, made clear its inability to implement, without Soviet support, the aggressive bloc strategy which it favored. The letter, signed by Premier Chou En-lai, observed that Peiping "would like very much to do everything possible" for Lumumba's government. However, because "China is far from Africa," it would not be possible for Peiping to send "military volunteers" and military hardware to the Congo; the best Peiping could manage would be a gift of one million pounds to Lumumba's government. This credit was apparently still available as of mid-January 1961.

Continuing Polemics, September - October 1960

Immediately after 10 September, the date of the long Chinese letter considered above, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen disappeared from the news. Teng and Peng, who, with Liu Shao-chi, had all along played leading roles in the Sino-Soviet dispute, went to Moscow at about this time in an effort (whether at Soviet or Chinese initiative is not known) to narrow the distance between Soviet and Chinese views and thus to make the forthcoming Moscow conference more profitable than the Bucharest meeting had been.*

Kommunist No. 13 appeared in September with an article on "Lenin's Theory of Socialist Revolution and Our Times." The article opened with strictures against dogmatism (the "talmudistic approach) and with an assertion of the need for a "creative" approach. It reaffirmed Soviet positions on the character of the epoch, the long-term attractive power of the socialist system, the ability of the bloc to impede Western interference in countries carrying out revolution, the good prospects for underdeveloped countries to break away from imperialism, the lack of need for wars to promote revolution, the terrible consequences of general war, the excessive price of such a war even if Communism were to emerge victorious, the value of "lasting peace" in encouraging the "liberation" movement and in depressing the imperialist economy, the special value of disarmament in that connection, the misinterpretation (Chinese) of "peaceful coexistence" as implying a virtual abandonment of the struggle, the recognition of "just" wars within the terms of coexistence, the advantages of coexistence for the struggle within the developed Western countries, the need for a gradualist program on the part of Communists in the West,** the correctness of the gradualist line taken at the Rome conference of European Communist parties, the good prospects for peaceful accession to power by Communist parties,** and the need to strugle against (Yugoslav) "revisionism" and (Chinese) "sectarianism."

*It is important to recognize that these party-machine leaders, Liu, Teng, and Peng, the principal figures of the most powerful group among Mao's lieutenants, have been firmly associated with the complex of Mao's positions offensive to Moscow.

**For an extended discussion of this aspect of the argument, see the FBIS study of 4 November 1960, "Theory of Revolutions Assumes New Prominence in Sino-Soviet Dispute." Because the Kommunist article is directed largely to the question of the tactics of Communist parties in the developed countries of the West, and because this question is not nearly so important in the Sino-Soviet dispute as questions relating to the underdeveloped countries, the article is not treated in detail in this paper.

On 24 September, Peiping published a long article by Li Wei-han with the frank title, "Study Chairman Mao's Writings and Gradually Change World-Outlook." This was the first of a series of articles attacking Soviet positions through the device of recounting Mao's many years of struggle against his opponents" in China and underlining the relevance of Mao's views to the present scene. Among the points made by Li were these: "The Mao Tse-tung ideology is Marxism-Leninism in its fullest developed form"; revisionists "succumb to the influence of the bourgeoisie and to the menace of imperialism, under the pretext of creatively developing Marxism-Leninism"; the revisionists forget that "armed struggle is the principal means of waging the revolution"; and revisionists "talk of peace and peaceful transition," neglecting the need "to oppose counterrevolutionary war with revolutionary war."

At the end of September, Peiping fired a fusillade at Soviet positions, on the occasion of the publication of a fourth volume of Mao's collected works, edited by the publications committee of the CCP central committee. In the first commentary, remarkable for failing even to mention the USSR, Peiping Radio offered a substantial reaffirmation of Chinese positions. Among the truths that Mao had long ago discovered were these: one must not harbor "illusions" about imperialism or be frightened of it; concessions are permissible only if the "basic interests" of the people are protected; peace is achieved by giving one's enemies "hard blows"; it is foolish to overestimate the enemy and underestimate "revolutionary forces"; it is necessary to "struggle" to prevent another world war; the "paper tiger" concept advocates despising the enemy in long-range terms while taking him seriously in particular engagements; reaction can be eliminated only by revolution; and imperialism cannot change its nature. The commentary remarked the "tremendous significance" of this volume for "present-day reality," among other things for "intensifying the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism."

On the following day (30 September), a People's Daily editorial addressed itself to Mao's fourth volume. The editorial covered some of the same ground as had the 29 September commentary, but it was much sharper on the need for violence in revolution. Lenin's writings on this theme were invoked in support of the proposition that the Chinese revolution was a model "bourgeois democratic revolution led by

the proletariat." The editorial conceded that "revolutionary armed struggle cannot be carried out anytime, anywhere, simply by subjectively wishing for it." The "objective and subjective possibilities, the degree of ripeness of the revolutionary crisis at a given time and place," must be taken into consideration. However, the editorial continued, whenever the crisis is "ripe," the question of "daring or not daring to take up arms and engage in resolute struggle...is one of fundamental principle which involves loyalty or disloyalty to the interests of the people...." In other words, although this passage did not mention the Soviet party or any other, there were some "ripe" situations, and Moscow and its followers had been backing away. The passage went on to observe that the Chinese party, when it had been in this critical situation, had chosen the revolutionary line rather than the "opportunist" line, had "had the courage to struggle and win," with the result that "today we have the Chinese People's Republic."

Two more pronouncements on Mao's fourth volume appeared in Red Flag on 1 October. One of these, a long editorial, returned to the theme of Mao's insistence on taking a "revolutionary" line as opposed to an "opportunist" line, and it reviewed Mao's scornful remarks to those who had held "timid and impotent right opportunist ideas which feared U.S. imperialism" and had overestimated the strength of domestic anti-Communist forces. The editorial defended Mao's "paper tiger" concept as a "fundamental strategic idea"--one which taught that "all Marxist-Leninists who genuinely (sic) want to lead the oppressed peoples...must be bold in waging the struggle...." The editorial went on to rebuke "some people"--today, not in the past--who considered that the "paper tiger" concept "represented an 'adventurist' point of view." The adventurist view, however, was said to be represented precisely by those who ignored the other half of Mao's formula, the half that enjoined tactical caution; and the editorial cited Mao's reaffirmation of both parts of his formula at a politburo meeting in December 1958.*

*The Russians must have been considerably annoyed by Mao's insistence on his concept as a principle for bloc action. Actually the Russians equally with the Chinese "despised the enemy strategically," i.e. were confident of long-term victory. The problem lay in their differing estimates of the relative strength of the bloc and the West at this time (1957-60). This led to differing assessments of the risks involved in particular situations, in which the Russians even more than the Chinese "respected the enemy tactically." Mao's December 1958 reaffirmation of both sides of his concept followed an apparent Chinese effort to induce Moscow to take greater risks in the Taiwan Strait venture than Khrushchev wished.

The fourth Chinese pronouncement in this group was a Red Flag article by Lin Piao, Mao's longtime favorite military leader who in 1959 had displaced Peng Te-huai as minister of defense. Writing on the theme of the Chinese Communist victory in the civil war as a "victory of Mao Tse-tung's thinking," Lin went over familiar ground. He resurrected one of Mao's old arguments, however, of relevance for bloc strategy toward the "liberation" movements:

> It is the dialectic of history that although a new-born force is weak and small, and in an inferior position in the beginning, nevertheless it will eventually defeat a decaying force which may be outwardly strong and large and in a superior postion.

Later in his article Lin found occasion to say that "it goes without saying, of course, that victory in revolution is by no means a windfall which can be obtained easily." One must not be afraid, he went on, of "frustrations and failures." He concluded resoundingly that "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line is a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line different from all opportunism," that the publication of this fourth volume was an "important event in the workers' movement of the world...," and that "to equip our minds with Mao Tse-tung's thinking, to preserve the purity of Marxism-Leninism, and to oppose modern revisionism in all its forms are our most important tasks at present."

The Soviet party continued in this period to comment on issues in the dispute, although not in such volume as Peiping. On 30 September TASS reviewed a recent article by the Soviet military theorist Talensky, who, like Kommunist, rejected the proposition that general war might be justified if it resulted in the demise of capitalism. Talensky also reaffirmed the Soviet position that local wars should be avoided because they could easily get out of control. This latter contention was promptly countered in an article by a Chinese Communist general reaffirming the Chinese view that the bloc must be willing to fight, support, and encourage local wars to advance the world Communist cause.

The strain in Sino-Soviet relations was highlighted on 1 October--Peiping's National Day--by the failure of any Communist state except Albania to send a delegation. Most of

the bloc communiques of congratulations--i.e., except Albania's, North Korea's, and North Vietnam's--were not enthusiastic and failed to felicitate Mao personally, and the bloc commentaries displayed differences with the Chinese in their assessments of the world scene.

There continued to be indications [redacted] of a deterioration in relations between Peiping on one hand and the USSR and most of the Eastern European states on the other. There were reports of withdrawals of Chinese students from Eastern European schools and of Eastern European technicians and students from China, of personal slights and ill-tempered personal exchanges between Chinese and other bloc representatives, of restrictions placed on bloc diplomats in Peiping, of a Moscow lecturer publicly identifying the Chinese as "dogmatists," and of the "permanent" suspension of Druzhba.

In early October, prior to attending the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, Khrushchev reportedly discussed Sino-Soviet relations with the Eastern European leaders who accompanied him. Much of this reported briefing covered familiar ground: that the Chinese party pretended to accept Soviet leadership but in fact did not, and that the Chinese were trying to split the world Communist movement; that the Chinese did not understand the changes in the world since the time of Lenin's formulations on the nature of the epoch; that Peiping disapproved of Soviet policies toward the underdeveloped countries; that the Chinese desired a much more militant interpretation of the fight for "peace"; that Chinese military thinking, the "leap forward," and the commune program were all foolish; that the Chinese had refused to cooperate in certain practical military matters; that Mao lived an insular life which encouraged delusions; and so on. The account of this briefing added one sharp item, which certain materials in the Soviet press seemed to support: that in recent months there had been disputes along the Sino-Soviet border, sometimes involving the presence of Chinese forces on territory claimed by the USSR.

This account included the first report of Khrushchev's thinking about the important question of forces in the Chinese party leadership which might sympathize with Moscow on aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev is said to have specified Peng Te-huai, the deposed defense minister, as one who had unsuccessfully opposed aspects of Mao's program.

He is said also to have described Chou En-lai as the "most decent" Chinese leader but as one who did not "dare" to oppose Mao.*

Khrushchev is also reported to have told the Satellite leaders that the Soviet party could not abandon fundamental positions, that a genuine resolution of the dispute was unlikely to take place at the Moscow conference, and, indeed, that Peiping might leave the bloc. Khrushchev is further said to have specified that only the Albanian party supported the Chinese.

On 13 October, in another defiant gesture, Peiping announced the publication by the Chinese Communist Foreign Language Press of six pamphlets of quotations from Lenin's works, in six languages (Russian, English, Spanish, French, German, Japanese). According to the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, this was the first time that Peiping had issued selections from Lenin (of this scope) in languages other than Chinese. As the Consulate General's analysis pointed out, this action was taken in the face of Khrushchev's admonitions about mechanically repeating things Lenin had said many years ago under very different conditions; and the selections were clearly made for the purpose of buttressing Peiping's case in appeals to other Communist parties for support.

*Peng's fall from favor was almost certainly related to opposition to aspects of Mao's military thinking, or to aspects of Mao's thinking which had (in Peng's view) a bad effect on the military establishment (such as the heavy demands laid on the military in the "leap forward" and commune programs). Chou En-lai has been less firmly associated with features of Mao's domestic and foreign policies obnoxious to the Soviets than have the party machine leaders such as Liu, Teng and Peng Chen, but, as the report of Khrushchev's remarks suggests, there is no evidence that Chou has opposed these policies, and he clearly remains in favor. It seems reasonable to believe that the Soviet party would prefer Chou to any of the party machine leaders as Mao's successor; at least at this time, Chou seems to be running behind Liu and perhaps Teng too.

On 19 October, Peiping commented bleakly on the results of Khrushchev's performance at the UN General Assembly. People's Daily reviewed the defeats of Soviet proposals at the session, cited "insults" to the Soviet delegation and its allies, and concluded that the United States had "pushed around" the bloc in a "most outrageous way."*

The Soviet press, commenting on Khrushchev's mission, took quite a different line, describing it as having launched a "far-flung and irresistible offensive." Khrushchev himself, reporting on his mission in a Moscow speech on 20 October, took occasion to defend vigorously some Soviet positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. He rejected the "adventurist" view of advancing Communist interests by initiating wars, asserted progress in winning over the uncommitted nations, and, in a clear effort to undercut the Chinese charge that Moscow as selling out the "liberation" movement, used his strongest language to that time in condemning French policy toward Algeria, to advertise Soviet recognition of the Algerian rebels, and to promise the rebels greater support. Khrushchev also remarked that "no nations" could be "indifferent" to the question of disarmament, and that those who "refrained from assisting" in the disarmament effort would increase the possibility of bringing on themselves as well as others the disaster of nuclear war. Toward the end of his speech, commenting on the recent "deterioration" in Soviet-American relations, he expressed confidence that relations would improve.

*Peiping again showed a very defective sense of the aggressive elements in Khrushchev's positions, in this case the strong indications that the Soviet party would pursue--as Peiping had been exhorting--a more aggressive program in "colonial" areas.

Failure of Preparatory Work, October 1960

There are only fragmentary accounts of the proceedings, during the first three weeks of October, of the meetings of the preparatory committee for the November conference of the 81 Communist parties. These accounts make clear, however, that the preparatory committee failed to arrive at a fully-agreed draft declaration, and that such agreement as existed was largely a nominal agreement.

The Soviet party delegation was reportedly headed by Mikhail Suslov and Frol Kozlov. The Chinese delegation was headed by Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen. All the bloc countries and 14 non-bloc countries were said to be represented--a total of 26 delegations.

The committee was apparently given a Soviet draft declaration to consider, and they may have been given certain other documents, such as the Chinese party's letter of 10 September to the Soviet party and a Soviet commentary on this letter. The definitive Soviet statement on the 10 September letter, however, was not to come until 5 November, in the form of a very long Soviet party letter which is considered in the next section.

Judging from the subsequent 6 December declaration of the parties, the Soviet draft included long discussions of the nature of the epoch, questions of war and peace, "peaceful coexistence," the "national liberation movement," prospects for peaceful accession to power, tactics for Communist parties in the West, and questions relating to the discipline of the world Communist movement.

Although there is little specific information on Chinese positions at this preparatory conference, it is reasonable to believe that Teng and Peng stood on the positions taken in the CCP's 10 September letter. The Chinese thus contended, presumably, that there should be a more militant and less conciliatory definition of the epoch, one emphasizing its revolutionary character; that Moscow exaggerated the consequences

of general war; that there was a continuing prospect of general war and a need for sharp vigilance; that the possibility of avoiding general war did not mean that there was a decreasing prospect of local wars; that some local wars, and all "liberation" wars, were positively to be welcomed; that the concept of "peaceful coexistence" was misleading and worked in general to the disadvantage of the world Communist movement, and that there should be greater emphasis on "struggle" and less on negotiations; that there should be a pledge of greater support to the "struggle," including all "just" wars; that there should be both "unity and struggle" with bourgeois nationalist leaders of independent countries, but with greater emphasis on struggle; that Communist parties in the West should expect and be prepared to use violence; that the Communist fronts should be "fighting" bodies; and so on. As for the discipline of the movement, the Chinese presumably contended that "revisionism" was still a danger in the bloc itself, that the Chinese party was not guilty of dogmatism and sectarianism, that the Soviet party was the "center" but all the parties should be equal, that Soviet positions were not binding on other parties (this is confirmed), and (this is also confirmed) that the Chinese party would not be overridden by a majority. The Chinese at the October meetings reportedly reiterated some of their charges about Soviet use of economic aid as a form of pressure.

Similarly, while there is little specific information on the positions taken by the Soviet representatives in these meetings, it is reasonable to believe that their positions are accurately reflected in the Soviet party's 5 November letter. Thus Suslov and Kozlov presumably contended that the Chinese definition of the epoch was far behind the times; that the bloc was strong enough to deter the West from general war and, increasingly, from local wars; that local wars should in general be avoided, due to the danger of their expansion; that the Soviet party did support "just" wars and would continue to do so; that the movement must not conceal the consequences of general war; that "peaceful coexistence" was a meaningful concept and one which worked to the advantage of the bloc; that disarmament was a useful issue, and would be to the bloc's advantage as a fact; that the neutral nations were important

to the Communist cause and should be conciliated; that in some countries Communist parties might come to power by peaceful means; that the movement must have a flexible policy in the fronts; and so on. As for the discipline of the movement, the Soviets presumably contended, as did the 5 November letter, that there was no revisionism within the bloc, that the threat was from Chinese dogmatism and sectarianism, that it was the Chinese party which sought a more than "equal" position, that the "unity" of the movement depended absolutely on the principle of majority rule; and so on. There is no information as to whether other Chinese charges were answered or as to whether the Soviet party made fresh charges.

There were apparently a number of speeches by other delegations in support of Soviet positions, and a speech supporting the Chinese by the Albanian delegation. Certain other delegations (mostly from the Far Eastern countries) apparently supported the Chinese on certain substantive points and perhaps on some formulations relating to the discipline of the movement. [redacted] the Chinese claimed to have the "full or partial" support of the Albanian, Australian, Cuban, Indonesian, and North Vietnamese delegations,* plus "one wing" of the Japanese.

Following the speeches, which reportedly included heated exchanges, a subcommittee apparently met for several days to consider the many amendments to the Soviet draft (possibly hundreds) which had been proposed. The subcommittee apparently struggled with the draft line by line and word by word.

The full preparatory committee reportedly met again at the end of the third week in October to consider the results of the labors of the subcommittee. The subcommittee had evidently arrived at acceptable formulations on most of the substantive questions, but not all; similarly, there was apparently agreement on most of the formulations relating to the discipline of the world Communist movement, but some important questions remained. In particular, judging from the protracted discussion of this point in the Soviet party's 5 November letter, the Chinese must have remained intransigently in opposition to the principle of majority rule, a principle which seems to have been phrased, in whole or in part, in terms of opposing

*Presumably "full" from the Albanians, "partial" from the others.

"factionalism" in the movement. The draft was evidently left uncompleted, for referral to the world Communist conference in early November.

In late October, the Chinese party reaffirmed some of its positions in commentaries on the tenth anniversary (25 October) of the beginning of Chinese intervention in the Korean war. The commentaries concluded that the Korean war had proved that "U.S. imperialism" was only a "paper tiger" which could be defeated by struggle. One of these commentaries, by the former commander of Chinese forces in Korea, reviewed Mao Tse-tung's warning to the Chinese people before 1950 not to relax their vigilance, the demonstration shortly thereafter that "U.S. imperialism" was the most vicious enemy of the world, the Chinese recognition of the need to participate in a "just" war, the success of a righteous cause against a materially superior enemy, the correct Chinese attitude of suspicion toward negotiations, and the correct policy of gaining a settlement by military blows. The entire course of the war, this commentary argued, had proved that "only by resolute resistance and hitting the enemy hard can aggression be curbed and national independence and world peace be defended."

The editorial discussed the 1917 October Revolution in terms of its vindication of revolutionary violence, which had made it the "prototype" for the world revolution. "Historical evidence has proven to us time and again," the editorial contended, that it is "impossible" to liberate the proletariat and establish socialism without "destroying the bourgeois state machine" and without "establishing a proletarian dictatorship." Lenin, the editorial went on, had firmly opposed the sacrifice of "fundamental" interests for "immediate" interests. Moreover, Lenin had been more clear-sighted than those "opportunists and revisionists"--including "many self-styled socialists"--who had opposed the armed uprising of the proletariat on the very eve of the October Revolution. The present epoch, the editorial asserted, is "unprecedentedly favorable for proletarian revolution" in various countries, and particularly so in the underdeveloped countries.

The longer Red Flag article carried further the Chinese attack on Soviet propositions relating to the possibility of

the proletariat gaining influence in the existing machinery of the bourgeois state. Marx was quoted to the effect that the proletariat "cannot simply make use of the exising state machine," and Lenin was invoked on the need to "destroy" this machine. The Chinese revolution was presented at length as a successful illustration of the principle of "smashing" the state machine. The article went so far as to contend that this was necessary for "any" reform, not to speak of transformation of the democratic into the socialist revolution.

On 1 November, in a double number of Red Flag following the unprecedented postponement of the mid-October number, the Chinese party again attacked Soviet positions. An editorial and a longer article in this number seemed to be directed toward portions of the article in Kommunist No. 13 several weeks earlier.*

The article went on to concede that proletarian parties might and should use parliamentary organizations for limited purposes, but, even where such legal means of struggle existed, it argued, the point of such struggle--contrary to the Kommunist argument--was precisely that of preparing for "armed uprising and war." The article concluded with a general attack on the Soviet emphasis on "peace" rather than on revolution:

> The modern revisionists and some foggy-minded peoples have treated revolutions in various countries and world peace as opposite things, contending that there should not be revolution or else world peace cannot be safeguarded. This view is absolutely preposterous, and is fundamentally opposed to Marxism-Leninism.

On 4 November, Liu Shao-chi was named to head the Chinese delegation to the Moscow conference, with Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen next in rank. The composition of the entire delegation

*This number of Red Flag, as well as Kommunist No. 13, is discussed at length in the FBIS study of 4 November 1960, "Theory of Revolutions Assumes New Prominence in Sino-Soviet Dispute."

--the most important party-machine figures, leading theorists, and specialists in work in front organizations, almost all of them persons close to Mao--made clear that the Chinese would come prepared for a continuing struggle.

Soviet and Chinese spokesmen stood firm in their respective positions in pronouncements on the Soviet anniversary (7 November), the very eve of the Moscow conference. Frol Kozlov, speaking in Moscow, politely reaffirmed Soviet positions on the struggle for peace as the "most important" task, the character of the epoch, the consequent feasibility of "peaceful coexistence" and the non-inevitability of war, the ability of the bloc to deter local wars, the need for disarmament, the usefulness of East-West talks, the importance of bloc "unity" and the concurrent importance of "fidelity to the principles of creative Marxism, ability to understand correctly and to apply doctrine in the new historic situation..." Chen Yi, speaking in Peiping the same day, had much praise for Soviet accomplishments but reaffirmed Chinese positions on the October Revolution as the prototype, on the fidelity of the Chinese revolution to this principle, on the Chinese creative development of Marxism-Leninism (specifying the general line, the "leap forward" and the communes), on the serious danger of a new world war, on the need to expose the struggle against the United States, on the "main danger" (within the bloc) of "revisionism," and so on. Chen concluded with the concurrent assertions that "the struggle against modern revisionism must be carried through to the end," and that the consolidation of the "unity" of the bloc and the world Communist movement was the "most important condition" for further Communist successes. Thus each party, on the eve of the conference, declared its favor for "unity" --on its own terms.

Moscow Reaffirms Its Positions, November 1960

On 5 November 1960 the Soviet party replied formally to the Chinese party's letter of 10 September. [redacted] This section of this paper deals entirely with the 5 November letter.

The letter began with the charge that the Chinese letter of 10 September did not really answer the Soviet letter of 21 June. Conceding that differences between the Soviet and Chinese parties had arisen prior to 1960, it argued that before 1960--specifically, in summer 1958 and fall 1959 when Khrushchev had visited Peiping--the parties had discussed these issues frankly. In 1960, however, after rejecting a Soviet bid in March for bilateral talks, the CCP in April had published the series of Lenin Anniversary articles attacking Soviet positions; and, after rejecting another Soviet invitation in May for talks, the CCP had launched its "open attack" on the CPSU, bringing the issues into "non-party organizations" (the fronts).

The Soviet party, the letter went on, had felt obliged to inform the world Communist movement of Peiping's behavior, and the Chinese party had been given an opportunity to state its case at the Bucharest conference. "All" the parties at Bucharest, the letter contended, had disapproved Chinese "methods"; the letter did not assert, however, that all the parties supported Moscow on all of the issues which had been in dispute.

Rather than responding in an "objective" way to the Soviet letter of 21 June (the one used to brief other parties at the Bucharest conference), the letter continued, the Chinese party had continued to raise issues and behave obstructively at Bucharest. Moreover, the Chinese letter of 10 September indicated that the CCP did not intend to heed the opinion of the "absolute majority" of the other parties. Further, whereas the Soviet letter of 21 June had taken a "comradely" tone, the CCP's 10 September letter had an

"uncomradely," overwraught and "overbearing" tone--indeed, the most "outrageous" tone anyone had taken toward the CPSU since the days of the Trotskyites.

The Soviet letter of 5 November went on to rebuke the CCP for resurrecting such "settled" questions as deStalinization and intrabloc relations in 1956, and for making the "monstrous" charge in its 10 September letter that the CPSU had departed from Marxist-Leninism. It reiterated the charge that the Chinese had indoctrinated foreign Communists visiting Peiping in the hope of splitting other Communist parties. Moreover, the letter asserted, CCP leaders were indoctrinating the entire body of the Chinese party in a spirit of hostility to the Soviet party. This section of the letter concluded with the warning that the Chinese party bore "full responsibility for the grave consequences" of its actions.

The Soviet letter then turned to the Chinese charge that the Soviet party was "embellishing" imperialism. At this point, in an aggrieved but defensive tone, the Soviet letter offered evidence at some length that the Soviet party had consistently "exposed" imperialism and adopted policies to weaken imperialism. In this connection, the letter went on, it was a "slander" to contend that the Soviet party was "flirting" with imperialism merely because Khrushchev had spoken favorably of President Eisenhower; Khrushchev's remarks, the letter contended, had had a diplomatic objective. The letter went on to emphasize that Khrushchev was not acting independently of the CPSU presidium, and to praise Khrushchev's "supreme devotion" to Marxism-Leninism and his "unflagging efforts" at home and abroad.

The Soviet letter of 5 November then turned to the contention--which had appeared early in the CCP letter of 10 September--that the CCP had induced the CPSU to adopt correct policies during the developments in Poland and Hungary in fall 1956. Contrary to the Chinese assertions, the letter said, Mao in 1956 had been willing to see Soviet troops used in Poland but had been irresolute with respect to the use of Soviet troops in Hungary.* Further, it was not true, as the

*The Soviet letter probably misrepresents the Chinese position to some degree here, as has frequently been the case with both parties in these exchanges. Chinese pronouncements in fall 1956 strongly suggested that the CCP did not favor Soviet military intervention in Poland but did favor it--at about the same time the Soviet party decided on it--in Hungary, i.e. as soon as the Hungarian government indicated its intention to leave the Bloc.

CCP's 10 September letter had charged, that Moscow in 1956 had wished to convoke a world Communist meeting to condemn Poland.

The Soviet letter, remarking that the events in Eastern Europe in 1956 had been one result of Stalin's mistakes, then took up the Chinese criticism of deStalinization. Whereas everyone had assumed that the CCP endorsed Soviet action against the "cult of the individual,"* the Chinese now had resurrected the entire issue. The letter at this point reiterated the Soviet party's rationale for its re-evaluation of Stalin.

The Soviet letter of 5 November then turned to the substantive questions in the Sino-Soviet dispute on world Communist strategy. It began by asserting flatly that the CCP was "mistaken" on "fundamental questions," i.e. the character of the present epoch, war and peace, "peaceful coexistence," and the "transition to socialism."

With respect to the first question, the letter reiterated the Soviet position that the world socialist system was becoming the "decisive factor" in world affairs, that the bloc's strength permitted the conclusion that war was no longer inevitable. It went on to specify that this formulation meant that the West was, and would increasingly be, deterred from general war.

As for the other half of the Soviet position on the balance of forces--namely, that the West is still militarily and economically so strong that it is advisable for the Bloc to seek its gains by actions not risking military clashes with the West--the letter dealt with this in terms of rejecting Mao's formulation that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind.** The letter observed sharply that Mao's phrase,

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*This clearly is a misrepresentation; the CCP's long commentary on this issue in April 1956 made clear that the Chinese had important reservations about the Soviet handling of the matter.

**The Chinese have used this formulation to imply that Bloc military strength is much greater than that of the West, an assessment which underlies their advocacy of an extremely militant revolutionary program. Khrushchev has usually preferred not to assert bloc military superiority, often employing the formula that the bloc is "at least as strong" as the West.

"probably advanced with the pretension" of adding to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in fact had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. It criticized this concept on several grounds, including its omission of the "liberation" movement.

The letter then turned explicitly to questions of war. It reaffirmed that the Soviet party recognized the possibility of war (kind unspecified) so long as imperialism exists, but argued that war could be prevented--as witness events since 1956 in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, and Cuba. It reiterated that it was now more difficult for the West to undertake wars of any kind than it had been, and it reaffirmed the Soviet view that local wars in general should be avoided, owing to the danger of their expansion. The letter described the Chinese attitude toward local wars--i.e., Peiping's slighting of the possibility of their expansion--as "extremely dangerous."

The Soviet letter agreed that it was necessary to distinguish between Western-initiated local wars and the concept of "revolutionary wars of liberation" in colonial areas. Such wars, the letter said, were indeed "permissible and inevitable," and were going on now in Algeria (a colonial area) and in Cuba (which Moscow and Peiping used to include in the "semi-colonial" areas, i.e. areas indirectly under imperialist control). The Soviet attitude toward such wars was described as "positive." The letter apparently again evaded the question of the degree of bloc support for such wars, contenting itself with defending the use of various means--including diplomacy--to deter the West from wars, the implication being that the West was deterred from a greater effort in Algeria and from military action against Castro.

The Soviet letter then returned to the question of assessing the balance of power and took up the related question of the consequences of general war. It reiterated Soviet criticism of Mao's "paper tiger" concept, on the ground that this concept encouraged complacency (meaning really, adventurism). The letter cited Mao's contention at the November 1957 conference of the parties that in a general war "at most half" of mankind would die, that imperialism would be wiped out and socialism triumphant everywhere, and that population losses would eventually be restored; the letter also cited the Chinese argument that victorious socialism could rapidly rebuild a greatly superior civilization on the ruins. The Soviet letter rejected the notion of presenting such a concept to the

"masses," and it stated flatly: "Contemporary imperialism is not a 'paper tiger.'" General war, it went on, would exterminate hundreds of millions of people, entail "untold" destruction of productive forces, and make "extremely difficult" the building of the new society. This section of the letter concluded with the assertions that socialism could achieve a world-wide triumph without general war and that the people must be told "plainly and honestly" of the existing danger.*

Passing on to the question of "peaceful coexistence," the Soviet letter of 5 November interpreted the Chinese letter of 10 September as favoring this concept but disagreeing on the proper interpretation of it. The letter rejected the Chinese contention that there had not been "peaceful coexistence" in the years since World War II; the letter cited successes in stopping "a number of local wars."

The letter reiterated criticism of Chinese policies toward the bourgeois nationalist leaders of the underdeveloped countries. The Chinese were again charged with underestimating the degree and importance of conflicts between these countries and the West, and engaging in harmful disputes with them.**

Still following the organization of the 21 June letter and (approximately) of the 10 September Chinese letter, the 5 November letter then took up the question of negotiations with the West, specifically in terms of disarmament. The Soviet use of the disarmament issue, the letter contended, was an essential part of the concept of "peaceful coexistence." It would not do to hand this issue over to the imperialists. Moreover, the Chinese were mistaken in contending that the achievement of some degree of disarmament would not free funds for underdeveloped countries, as the USSR planned to do just that as part of the program of seducing such countries. The letter denied that Moscow planned to have a "world without arms", as the Soviet plan envisaged militia in every state. Reaching farther, the Soviet letter argued that disarmament would help to correct the weapons imbalance between the imperialists and the workers, the imperialist oppressors and the colonial liberation forces. The letter conceded again the

*In the context, this appears to refer to the dreadful consequences of general war.

**The letter apparently evaded the other strong charges against the Soviet conception of "peaceful coexistence" (see pp. 29-30),

difficulty of reaching a disarmament agreement, but reaffirmed this as a long-term goal.

Turning then to the question of the "transition of socialism"--i.e., accession to power by Communist parties--the Soviet letter rejected the Chinese charge that Khrushchev had a "non-revolutionary" point of view on this. The letter contended (misleadingly) that Khrushchev had simply said that violence would not always be necessary, and it reviewed Soviet statements on this point. It specified that the Soviet concept was not the "revisionist" notion of simply winning a parliamentary majority, but rather using the parliament as one of the means of establishing a proletarian dictatorship. The letter went on to reject the charge that the Soviet party had "evaded" key questions relating to the establishment of Communist power.

The Soviet letter continued its discussion of this question with the contention that a proper understanding of the balance of forces--the same considerations which permitted the thesis of the non-inevitability of wars--applied to the possibility of peaceful accession to power. That is, bloc military and economic power would increasingly influence the people of the world, increasingly strengthen the local Communist parties, and increasingly deter imperialist interference in the affairs of any people carrying out a revolution. Replying to the Chinese assertion that the concept of "peaceful" accession was acceptable as a tactic but not as a genuine expectation, the Soviet letter reaffirmed that the Soviet party and its supporters did indeed expect this to happen "in a number of countries." The CCP was rebuked for having insisted that this was never possible.

Departing from the organization of the 21 June letter and of the 10 September letter, the Soviet letter of 5 November did not treat separately the question of the use of the world Communist fronts but included this question in the larger category of "questions" of the world Communist movement. This section began by rejecting the Chinese contention--not previously known--that there was "ideological discord" within the movement as a whole. There was no general discord, the letter went on, there was only Chinese dogmatism and obstructionism. The letter reiterated that revisionism in the bloc was routed, whereas dogmatism and sectarianism existed and must be combatted. Countering the Chinese charge of "bourgeois"

influence on the Soviet party, the letter observed loftily that "dogmatism as we know is a result of petty bourgeois influence," and that the source of "sectarianism" was political immaturity. There was apparently much embroidery of this theme.

As for the Chinese charge that Moscow wanted everyone to be a blind adherent to Soviet experience, the Soviet letter of 5 November declared that the Soviet party "respected everything new" contributed by other parties (without specifying any contributions), but went on to assert that there could not be a "Russian" Marxism or "Chinese" Marxism or "Indian" Marxism or any other kind of national Marxism. The letter rebuked the Chinese for having contended (in January 1960) that Mao had "Sinicized" Marxism.

This section of the letter concluded by remarking the Chinese tendency to claim the role of "sole defenders and interpreters" of Marxism-Leninism, to have a monopoly on developing this body of thought, and to have the right to excommunicate those who disagreed. Judging from the Chinese press, the letter said, "after Lenin there appeared a chasm ...filled only by the works of the Chinese comrades."

Taking up the question of work in the world Communist fronts, the letter agreed that there certainly were differences in the Soviet and Chinese views, but it rejected the notion that the difference lay in whether the fronts were to be fighting organizations. Of course they were, the letter said; the question was how to wage the fight. The letter reiterated that it was counterproductive to "impose alien tasks and slogans," and it gave a number of instances of such Chinese action. The letter argued reasonably that the Chinese course would enlist only those who already entirely agreed with the Communist position, and thus would defeat the purpose of the fronts. The letter was particularly sharp in its rebuke of the "shameful and inadmissible" Chinese attacks on Soviet efforts to attract--in the fronts--representatives of "national liberation movements," including "bourgeois" figures.

Turning to the question of relations among the Communist parties, the letter began with the observation that the Chinese desire for "unity" was not supported by practical deeds. After the Bucharest conference, the letter went on, the Chinese had continued to ignore majority opinion and to circulate

documents among other parties. Here the letter insisted at some length that the "unity" of the world Communist movement depended on respect for the opinion of the majority, and it apparently invoked in this connection the Leninist principle (in intraparty affairs) of carrying out the party's decision even if one does not agree with it.

The letter went on to reject the Chinese charge that the Soviet party violated the principle of "equality" among parties, and observed that this charge was a screen for the CCP's own violations of "equality and comradely cooperation." Following Khrushchev's line at the meeting of 22 October, the letter dispensed with the concept of "leaders and led" in the world Communist movement, asserting that the CPSU had rejected this concept as long ago as the 21st Congress. Indeed, the letter continued, gaining momentum, if there was anyone who showed a tendency to occupy a special position in the movement and to "abuse the trust" of fraternal parties, it was the Chinese comrades. According to the Chinese, the letter went on, the Soviet party had made one mistake after another since 1956, but now the CCP's April 1960 articles had brought clarity out of confusion. Confusion indeed existed, the letter said, but in the minds of those who wrote the articles.

Taking up the final question of relations between the two governments, the letter set forth the record of Soviet political, military and economic support of Peiping, and rejected the charge of having conducted an anti-Chinese campaign. Anyhow, the CCP started it, the letter said, with its April 1960 articles and its behavior at the WFTU meeting in June. The letter professed indignation at the charge that Soviet aid was being used as a means of pressure (i.e. the withdrawal of the technicians). The letter observed that Soviet aid to China--much more extensive than simply the technicians--had been given China at the cost of depriving the deserving Soviet consumer, and it remarked at this point that, while Peiping had sent goods in exchange, the USSR "really had no use for them" and had taken them only to help the Chinese. The letter summed up Soviet scientific and technological aid--in the form of documents, designs, drawings, and specifications--to Peiping as having been worth six billion rubles, plus the "43 years' experience" accumulated by Soviet personnel who had prepared them, plus the assignment of specialists needed in the USSR itself. In the

past this had been much appreciated, but now the Chinese party was minimizing it. The letter at this point emitted a shriek of outrage at Chinese remarks to the effect that the truth could not be bought and that Peiping would not trade its principles for technicians. The letter reviewed the Soviet reasons--obviously insufficient in themselves--for withdrawing the technicians.

The letter concluded, as had the 10 September Chinese letter, with an expression of desire for "unity," and it warned again against actions weakening or breaking this unity. The Soviet party and other parties, it said, were "seriously alarmed" by Chinese actions of this kind. Moreover, the world Communist movement was not going to wait for the "verdict of history."

By this time (early November), both the Soviet and Chinese parties had gone to much effort to encourage the view that neither would back down at the Moscow conference, even if this meant the separation (voluntary or involuntary) of the Chinese party from the world Communist movement. In other words, the two parties were playing "chicken"--and it was not known whether either was willing to swerve at the last moment.

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